My roommates and I do a decent job of keeping our apartment clean, but there’s definitely room for improvement in our systems.  The problem is that cleaning our apartment is a public good, and like any public good, there’s tons of room for free-riding.  Anyone who has ever had roommates has most likely dealt with dirty dishes in the sink, or papers on the table, or piles of unread mail.  Unfortunately,  my brilliant idea, described below, is something only an economist could love, and I live with lawyers.

The solution to our problem, of course, is to attach a price to the various household chores we want done and compensate the person who accomplishes the task by having the other two roommates pay him.  I struggled with how to set the optimum level of payment for each task.  We could have each person decide how much they’d pay for the task, but what if nobody wanted to work at that level?  An alternative is to say how much each person wants to charge, but what if nobody pays it?

Co-op housing attempts to solve this problem through a system of fines and penalties, but if the fines are too low, then it will be seen as a charge for the service and not a penalty (thanks behavioral economics!).  You can force compliance by making the charges too high, but then there’s an opportunity for trade - between people who want to clean or need money and those who don’t - that’s being missed.

The optimal solution goes back to game theory - which teaches us how to incent both action and truth-telling.  There’s a classic problem in game theory where two business partners are trying to split a pie, or their company, or something.  Anyways, two people are trying to split something - and the best way to find an equitable split is to have the first player propose how much the pie/company is worth to them, and the second player decides whether to buy them out at that price, or sell to them at that price.  Because Player One doesn’t know which option Player Two will choose, they want to be as honest as possible about their true value of the pie/company/something, and will be indifferent between the two options.

The same goes for cleaning the apartment.  Give one roommate the option of saying what they value the chore at.  The other roommate has the option of either completing the chore at that price, or they can pay to have it done.  Running through the register of household cleaning tasks should create an equitable outcome, or give one roommate some supplemental income as a maid.  Either way, everyone wins - we all get to live in a clean apartment.

How’s this for a long post, Mom?

Categories: Behavioral Economics, Crazy Theories, Governance, Incentive Centered Design, Information Economics, Strategy
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American Express recently sent me an e-mail with this offer:

From June 2-12, 2008, there will be one U.S. destination on sale each weekday, with some packages retailing below $3,500. Once on sale, the price of each package drops every 20 minutes. So when the price seems right, you better grab yours before it’s gone. Visit the website now to check out in-depth trip details and photos, and to sign up to receive an e-mail reminder for when the trips you want go on sale.

It looks like they’re selling the vacation packages using an Open Descending Bid Auction, also known as a Dutch Auction.  If we think back to our Auction Theory, this should give us the same result as a Sealed-Bid First Price auction, but American Express has an excellent opportunity to test whether or not that holds in a real world environment.  From a behavioral perspective, in the real world and not a laboratory, will bidders react the same way in both situations?  My hunch is no, but I don’t have data to back it up - could my readers who still have unfettered access to academic journals find some?

Dutch Auctions are currently used by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Dutch Flower Merchants, and a variant was used for Google’s original IPO.

Categories: Behavioral Economics, Business and Economics, Incentive Centered Design, Information Economics, Matching Mechanisms, Travel
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Joel Spolsky just posted three parts (1,2,3) of a speech he gave at Yale in which he warns students to avoid corporate IT:

Now, at a product company, for example, if you’re a software developer working on a software product or even an online product like Google or Facebook, the better you make the product, the better it sells. The key point about in-house development is that once it’s “good enough,” you stop.

Spolsky is 100% right about corporate IT organizations - they are crappy places to work. You don’t get to work on fun projects, you’re disconnected from the business, you’re stuck making things quickly rather than high-quality, and everyone on the business-line hates you, to the point where they keep farming out your job to consultants like Accenture, Deloitte, and IBM.

But the reason IT is miserable is it’s own fault - in house IT is, for the most part, a monopoly, and it’s going to be just as miserable as working at any other monopoly. You don’t have to worry about what your internal customer needs, because they can’t go someplace else (you don’t run competing IT shops). You don’t have to run efficiently because there aren’t market pressures. For every complaint from someone in IT that their creative freedom is restricted, there’s a complaint on the business side for the problems that crop up when developers decide they want to play - for instance every business application needs to have it’s own authentication, with it’s own look and feel, and it’s own user database. Kerberos was invented how long ago? If you’re developing a product and you make your users sign-in a different way to use different areas of your product, creative destruction will take care of you pretty quickly, but when you’re in the monopoly that is corporate IT, the users don’t have anywhere else to go.

And what of the consultants that IT hates so much, who can charge $300 an hour to have a 22 year-old with an English degree and a crash course in .Net write applications for you? They do something corporate IT isn’t very good at - they spend most of their time figuring out what the biggest problem is, and then they develop an application that solves it. In the meantime, corporate IT has an amorphous idea of what the business is and starts developing applications that they think might be relevant. That’s how monopolies work - they push products onto the market as they develop them, without regards to customer needs. Customers, who don’t have a choice, take what they can get.

There are other structural forces that make corporate IT miserable. For instance, maintenance and new development usually come out of separate budgets, so developers have little incentive to make an efficient product that is cost effective to maintain - that’s somebody else’s problem. Because once a project ends they either have to find a new one or move into maintaining the code they wrote, they actually have a perverse incentive to write bad code that’s difficult to maintain, modify, and interact with. The best way to build job security is to invent a role nobody else can do. If you’re looking for anecdotal evidence, just look at the way the owners of legacy applications fight any attempt to modernize.

If you’re developing a product, any new feature you add provides value to the customer, that’s why it’s valued. Great companies value IT (and other support functions like HR) because they drive value to the bottom line. In fact, great companies are usually built on great people and great technology. When done right, IT contributes straight to the bottom line, and IT professionals are valuable parts of the business team.

In the end, the problems with corporate IT are based around the same issue - there is no accountability to the customer. That’s the root of line-managers’ complaints about IT and it drives into most of the problems programmers feel when working in corporate IT. Solve it, and all of a sudden IT becomes a great place to work, and a valued part of the team.

Categories: Business and Economics, Customer Engagement, Incentive Centered Design, Information Economics, Managing, Technology
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A new video short from Kansas State anthropologist Michael Wesch on the changing characteristics of information in a digital world:

The same Michael Wesch created this video about Web 2.0 which made the rounds a few months back.

Categories: Information Economics, Social Software, Technology
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Looks like Warren Buffet is picking a successor. Too bad an expert in Incentive Design didn’t help him come up with his selection criteria:

When I heard about this, the romance died. For all of Mr. Buffett’s reputation as the ultimate nonmutual fund, he may have just fallen into one of the biggest mutual fund traps of all — forgetting how incentives affect fund managers’ behavior.

Winner take all stock market games don’t reward the best investors, they reward the luckiest. It’s a spin-of-the-wheel that determines just which high-risk high-return investment hits pay dirt. Long term success doesn’t matter. The article also discusses the inventives investment managers face to screw their clients.

Categories: Business and Economics, Careers, Incentive Centered Design, Information Economics, Managing
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In an interview, Tim O’Reilly points out the big deal of Web 2.0 - it’s about the information:

That goes back to a major theme of web 2.0 that people haven’t yet tweaked to. It’s really about data and who owns and controls, or gives the best access to, a class of data. Amazon is now the definitive source for data about whole sets of products — fungible consumer products. EBay is the authoritative source for the secondary market of those products. Google is the authority for information about facts, but they’re relatively undifferentiated.

Information is the oil/gold/guns of the twentieth century.

Categories: Business and Economics, Distribution, Information Economics, Information Markets, Social Software, Technology
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Another bit of down to earth wisdom for the masses from Tycho at Penny Arcade:

People seem to think that by posting in threads and agreeing with other people they are changing the world. They are not. They are posting in threads online. The universe will not be altered by forum threads, even those which are very wry. Being outraged online is a form of entertainment, and refreshing a thread to receive a hit of consensus packs the thrill of genuine activism without requiring any sweat. I’m afraid this test may require more from the community than a sardonic jpeg.

One day, hopefully before I go back, I’ll get to a write up about my impressions from their PAX convention. The short version: there are real people behind lots of the stuff you see written online, and most of them are exactly like you’d expect, and don’t behave that differently offline.

Categories: Information Economics, Politics, Social Software, Technology
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Joanna Jacobs passes along Barry Schwartz’s recommendation that elite universities use a lottery for admissions (I couldn’t find the whole article):

There is probably a right answer to the questions “Whom should we admit?” or “Which college should I select?” But we won’t know until after the fact. Chance factors (roommate assignment, romantic successes or failures, or which English professor evaluates your first papers) might have a bigger effect on success and satisfaction than the tiny differences among applicants (or schools) within the range of acceptability. So once a set of “good enough” students or “good enough” schools has been identified, it probably doesn’t matter much which one you choose; or if it does matter, there is no way to know in advance what the right choice is.

College admissions is a crap shoot, and anyone who tells you otherwise is lying. Let colleges admit the all-stars, reject the losers, and show the people in the middle just how much randomness is involved. As long as students are using the Common Application to apply to multiple schools, though, the application becomes even more like a lotto ticket. Is this applicant applying to Cornell to hedge in case they don’t get into Columbia, or do they really want to go there?

The solution? Use a bidding market. Give each student who fills out the common application 1000 points and allow them to allocate them among schools they apply to. Weight students in the lottery based on the number of points they bid, so that students who bid more get more of a chance. People will still get into college - being in the “middle” group of Harvard applicants still makes you in the top group of many other great schools.

Bidding systems solve another problem as well. A friend of mine used to work in an admissions office, and she said they would look at other schools a candidate applied to and reject those who seemed highly qualified and applied to top tier schools because the office thought they weren’t likely to accept the admissions offer in the first place. Restricting the number of bidding points lets universities measure not only a student’s binary desire to attend signaled by applying (yes/no), but also the strength of their desire to attend the school (number of points bid).

Most people overestimate the role of going to a good college on life outcomes. They also overestimate how good admissions offices are at picking which people get in and which don’t. Exposing just how random it is, as Schwartz notes, will expose just how much “luck” is involved. Does that mean that a Harvard student and a Community College student are on the same intellectual level? Doubtful, but it will show the Princeton student that they could just as easily be at Duke, if only the lottery had been different.

Categories: Education, Incentive Centered Design, Information Economics, Information Markets, Matching Mechanisms, The Academy
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Or will at least be on a TV.

Tycho of Penny Arcade writes:

Forming your own bands which create original music and then upload these tracks - complete with vocals - to a community rated central repository verges on the supernatural. That’s the new MTV. It’s what MTV looks like when we seize the reins in glorious revolution.

He’s talking about Rock Band, the upcoming game from the makers of Guitar Hero.

Established companies are finally starting to ‘get it’ and empower their users or risk becoming irrelevant.

Categories: Business and Economics, Community, Information Economics, Social Software, Technology
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From the dumbest column I’ve ever read in Slate (which I normally read before anything else):

Suppose the national defense of the United States were relegated to the private sector. Instead of the publicly funded Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, the country would be defended by private militias funded mainly by insurance companies. In the event of foreign attack on U.S. soil, the militias would defend those citizens in the affected areas who’d paid defense insurance premiums through their places of work (or, if self-employed, as individuals).

The best-armed troops would defend the wealthiest and most hawkish segments of the population, who would have paid the highest premiums.

The premise of the article is that we should nationalize health care because it’s like the military, and look how good a nationalized military is. Wow, lets go through all the ways this is flawed.

1. National Defense is a public good, health care is not. You may think that health care is a right, or something everyone is entitled to, and those are philosophical positions, but health care doesn’t fit the definition of a public good in the economic sense. First of all, it isn’t non-rival, which means that if I consume some health care, you can’t consume that same amount. If I take a pill, or use a X-Ray machine, you can’t take that same pill or use the machine at the same time. In contrast, an army that protects the United States offers the same amount of protection, whether or not you add more people to it. Second, health care is excludable. I can stop you from taking a pill or getting that X-Ray if you don’t pay for it. But with national defense, if you don’t pay your taxes, the army still protects you. There are fundamental characteristics between them that make them different.
2. In general, everyone in the country shares the same risk if the country is attacked. Granted, people in high-risk areas may suffer a greater risk due to terrorism, and that is actually reflected most of the time in higher local tax rates to support police counter-terrorism, or insurance premiums for potential targets. In general, though, if there is a large scale attack against the United States or its allies, the risk to all of us is the same. When it comes to health care, we all have different amounts of risk, and only minimal information about that risk. Well planned insurance lets us pool this risk to reduce the cost to individuals and overcome some of this information problem. Nationalized health care has nothing to do with risk pooling, and it effectively involves the health and low-risk subsidizing the unhealthy and high-risk.
3. National defense is a pretty bad example. There’s definitely consensus on the left, and I think among some people on the right that we spend way too much on national defense. It costs the Defense Department orders of magnitude more to procure technology that is available cheaply in the private sector. Defense technology research involves massive outlays relative to the returns. The military is a sprawling and inefficient bureaucracy with a sprawling and inefficient supplier network supporting it. Do we really want to take our relatively dynamic biomedical research sector and make it part of a government supplier complex? Is this really a way to reduce costs?

I later found that Arnold Kling took a briefer, though probably more economically informed shot at the column as well.

Categories: America, Business and Economics, Distribution, Governance, Incentive Centered Design, Information Economics, Politics
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Chris Anderson has noticed that risk aversion and a lack of imagination are making CIOs irrelevant:

The consequence of this is that many CIOs are now just one step above Building Maintenance. They have the unpleasant job of mopping up data spills when they happen, along with enforcing draconian data retention policies sent down from the legal department. They respond to trouble tickets and disable user permissions. They practice saying “No”, not “What if…” And they block the ports used by the most popular services, from Skype to Second Life, which always reminds me of the old joke about the English shopkeeper who, when asked what happened to a certain product, answered “We don’t stock it anymore. It kept selling out.”

Later on he notes that this is the biggest problem at universities:

The life of a university CIO is like the life of a telco CEO, fast forwarded by about five years. The users want a dumb pipe, preferably at gigabit speed. They neither need or want the university to administer their email, wikis, blogs, video storage or discussion groups. They want it to simply get out of their way.

From what I know, universities didn’t create CIOs until recently, and they don’t really have much function. Most departments manage there own IT. In the liberal arts, this just means faculty and administrator desktops, but in the hard sciences it usually involves research equipment that goes over the central service’s head. Yes, there are certain shared services that the university needs - most importantly single sign-on, but I’d argue mail and file storage as well - but then get out of the way. With the price of storage as low as it is, I can’t imagine why universities have such low quotas, which is one of the things that drives engineering and art colleges to run their own parallel systems. If your job is keeping the lights on, that’s where you need to innovate - give people the tools they need to do what they want to do better, don’t blow money on tools that other people do better, cheaper.

And, as in all cases, if you’re having discussions about whether or not you’re relevant anymore, it means you’re already irrelevant. It’s time to either reinvent what you do, or stop wasting resources.

Categories: Business and Economics, Governance, Information Economics, Libraries, The Academy
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Prizes stimulate innovation better than grants:

BACK in the 1700s, prizes were a fairly common way to reward innovation. Most famously, the British Parliament offered the £20,000 longitude prize to anyone who figured out how to pinpoint location on the open sea. Dava Sobel’s best-selling 1995 book “Longitude” told the story of the competition that ensued, and Mr. Hastings mentioned the longitude prize as a model at that meeting back in March.

Eventually, though, prizes began to be replaced by grants that awarded money upfront. Some of this was for good reason. As science became more advanced, scientists often needed to buy expensive equipment and hire a staff before having any chance of making a discovery.

The internet is changing the economics of innovation and discovery.  Science is no longer expensive like it once was, it is within the realm of dedicated and educated hobbyists.  Robin Hanson, who the article discusses, is everywhere you find interesting information economics problems.

Categories: Business and Economics, Incentive Centered Design, Information Asymmetries, Information Economics, Information Markets, Matching Mechanisms, Science, Social Software, Strategy, Technology, Users as Partners
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Chris Anderson’s Long Tail Blog takes a look at how Anheuser-Busch is expanding into niche brands:

Earlier this month I got in touch with Anheuser-Busch to hear from the Clydesdale’s mouth why the shift from hits to niches was coming to suds, too. I mean, I get how the Internet lowers the costs of distribution in many markets to allow for more choice (the “infinite shelf space” effect), but how does that apply to real bottles on real shelves?

Categories: Business and Economics, Distribution, Information Economics, Marketing, Strategy
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Chris Anderson’s Long Tail Blog asks do artists who give their music away for free want to make money?

Many do, but they’re just smarter than most music industry execs. They understand the difference between abundance and scarcity economics. Music as a digital product enjoys near-zero costs of production and distribution–classic abundance economics. When costs are near zero, you might as well make the price zero, too, something thousands of bands have figured out.

Meanwhile, the one thing that you can’t digitize and distribute with full fidelity is a live show. That’s scarcity economics. No wonder the average price for a ticket was $61 last year, up 8%–in an era when digital products are commodities, there’s a premium on experience. No surprise that bands are increasingly giving away their recorded music as marketing for their concerts, which offer something no MP3 can match.

Categories: Business and Economics, Distribution, Entertainment Media, Incentive Centered Design, Information Economics, Marketing, Strategy
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FuturTech Panels are today.  Everybody come!

Categories: Business and Economics, Futurtech, Graduate School, Information Economics, Science, Social Software, Technology, Winter of Dave
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